

Message Text

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ACTION IO-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDA-05 ERDA-05 AF-06 ARA-06

CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-07 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NASA-01

NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01 PRS-01

OES-03 SS-15 USIA-06 SAJ-01 NRC-05 /120 W

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P R 151712Z NOV 75

FM USMISSION USUN NY

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4056

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEC TION 1 OF 2 USUN 6004

FOR ACDA AND IO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM PFOR UNGA UR US

SUBJ: UNGA DISARMAMENT: CONSULTATIONS WITH USSR ON SOVIET MASS
DESTRUCTION WEAPONS (MDW) PROPOSAL

REFS: (A) USUN 5636

(B) USUN 5735

(C) STATE 230707

SUMMARY: AT NOV 14 LUNCHEON HOSTED BY AMB MOYNIHAN AND
ATTENDED BY PRINCIPAL US AND SOVIET OFFICIALS DEALING WITH
UNGA DISARMAMENT DEBATE, THE PRIMARY TOPICS OF CONVERSATION
WERE THE SOVIET MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS INITIATIVE (MDW),
AND SWEDISH PROPOSAL TO REVIEW THE UN ROLE IN DISARMAMENT
(SEPTEL). SOVIETS MADE A STRONG PITCH FOR US SUPPORT FOR
THE MDW INITIATIVE. IN EXTENSIVE PRESENTATION, ISSRAELYAN
STRESSED THAT PROPOSAL IS NOT INTENDED TO APPLY TO WEAPONS
OR WEAPONS SYTEM NOW IN EXISTENCE, AND THAT IT IS NOT
INTENDED TO INTERFERE WITH DISARMAMENT EFFORTS IN OTHER
FORUMS, SUCH AS SALT. WHEN SOVIETS AFTER INITIAL
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RESISTANCE CONCEDED WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER CHANGES IN

THEIR CURRENT DRAFT RESOLUTION ON MDW, TWO SIDES AGREED TO TRY TO WORK OUT, AD REFERENDUM, PROCEDURAL APPROACH WHICH US MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACCEPT. END SUMMARY.

1. PURSUANT TO AMB MOYNIHAN'S SUGGESTION, HE HOSTED LUNCH FOR SOVIET PERMREP MALIK, MFA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFAIRS DIRECTOR ISSRAELYAN AND CCD REP ROSHCIN, ACCOMPANIED BY SOVIET DELOFFS, TO DISCUSS DISARMAMENT ISSUES. US PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED AMBS MOYNIHAN, MARTIN AND SHERER AND US DELOFFS. AT OUTSET ISSRAELYAN VOLUNTEERED A LONG, AND, AT TIMES, IMPASSIONED PRESENTATION OF THE SOVIET MDW INITIATIVE. DESCRIBING THE INITIATIVE AS "CONSTRUCTIVE AND REALISTIC," ISSRAELYAN ADMITTED THAT IT ALSO WAS "COMPLICATED." HE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THE NEED TO PROCEED NOW TO BAN NEW TYPES AND NEW SYSTEMS OF WEAPONS WHICH ARE ON THE EVE OF BEING DEVELOPED.

2. ISRAELYAN SAID THAT "NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS" ARE THOSE BASED ON ENTIRELY NEW SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES SUCH AS RADIOLOGICAL, LASER, OR SUB-NUCLEAR PARTICLE WEAPONS. WHILE SOVIETS HAD ORIGINALLY THOUGHT IT ADVISABLE TO TRY TO DEFINE IN THE DRAFT MDW TREATY EXACTLY WHAT WEAPONS THE TREATY WOULD ENCOMPASS, IT WAS DECIDED THAT SUCH AN APPROACH WAS PREMATURE AND "ONE-SIDED." ON WHAT CONSTITUTED A "NEW SYSTEM" OF WEAPONS, ISSRAELYAN SAID THE PROBLEM OF IDENTIFICATION WAS SIMPLER. "SYSTEMS" INCLUDES NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BACTERIOLOGICAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS (THE LATTER OF COURSE ALREADY PROHIBITED).

3. ISSRAELYAN EMPHASIZED REPEATEDLY THAT SOVIET TREATY WOULD COVER NEITHER EXISTING SYSTEMS NOR SYSTEMS IN A PROJECT PHASE, BUT ONLY THOSE WEAPONS SYSTEMS WHICH DO NOT YET EXIST. REFERRING TO POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS AND THE MDW INITIATIVE, ISSRAELYAN STRESSED THAT THEY HAVE "NOTHING" TO DO WITH EACH OTHER. SALT NEGOTIATIONS DID NOT CONCERN NEW TYPES OF MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS OR NEW SYSTEMS AND GENERATIONS OF WEAPONS TO COME. THE MDW INITIATIVE IS NOT INTENDED TO INTERFERE WITH OR COMPLICATE THE SALT TALKS, HE SAID. CONFIDENTIAL

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4. ISSRAELYAN RECOGNIZED TWO AREAS OF DIFFICULTY IN THE SOVIET INITIATIVE: (A) DEFINITION OR SPECIFICATION OF WEAPONS TO BE COVERED, AND (B) NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE DELICATE NATURE OF THE FIRST PROBLEM BECAUSE OF THE "TOP SECRET" MATTERS IT ENCOMPASSES. HE ALSO CONCEDED THE DIFFICULTY OF VERIFICATION AND OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT OF CERTAIN TECHNOLOGIES

FOR PEACEFUL VERSUS MILITARY PURPOSES. NEVERTHELESS, ISSRAELYAN SAID, THE ONLY WAY TO SAVE MANKIND FROM MORE HORRIBLE TYPES OF MDW IS TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS.

5. MAINTAINING THAT THE SOVIET MDW RESOLUTION IS ENTIRELY PROCEDURAL, ISSRAELYAN SAID THE USSR IS OPEN MINDED ABOUT HOW BEST TO PROCEED. HE OBSERVED THAT THE RESOLUTION DOES NOT ENDORSE THE SOVIET DRAFT CONVENTION BUT RATHER THE IDEA AND NECESSITY OF DOING SOMETHING ABOUT MDW. IN THIS CONNECTION ISSRAELYAN EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT THE ALLEGED US INDIFFERENCE TOWARD THE PROPOSAL, COMPARING THIS APPARENT LACK OF INTEREST WITH QUERIES AND REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION BY OTHER DELEGATIONS. HE CITED MEETINGS WITH THE VINCI GROUP AND THE NORDIC GROUP AS EVIDENCE OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF OTHERS.

6. IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR SHERER'S QUERY AS TO WHY THE USSR HAD INTRODUCED THE MDW PROPOSAL IN A MULTI-LATERAL RATHER THAN BILATERAL FORUM, ISSARELYAN RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT EXCLUDE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SUBJECT. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE VIEWS OF OTHER SECURITY COUNCIL PERMANENT MEMBERS, MILITARILY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND OTHERS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. THESE COUNTRIES (HE SPECIFIED THE FRG AS AN EXAMPLE) HAD SOPHISTICATED SCIENTISTS WHO COULD MAKE REAL CONTRIBUTION TO CONSIDERATION AND SOLUTION OF MDW PROBLEM. ROSHCIN ADDED THAT THE RESOLUTION WOULD TRANSFER ACTION ON THE MDW INITIATIVE TO THE CCD SO THAT IT WOULD BE UP TO THE CCD TO DECIDE HOW TO PROCEED FURTHER.

7. MARTIN THANKED ISSRAELYAN FOR HIS EXTENSIVE PRESENTATION WHICH, HE SAID, HAD NOT RESOLVED OUR PROBLEMS
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WITH THE INITIATIVE BUT HAD HELPED. HE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN ISSRAELYAN'S STATEMENT THAT THE INITIATIVE IS NOT INTENDED TO AFFECT EXISTING DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS AND SAID THAT POINT MUST BE MADE VERY CLEAR. MARTIN EMPHASIZED THAT WE WANT NOTHING TO INTERFERE WITH OUR MOST IMPORTANT DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS--THOSE WITH THE USSR.

8. AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH THE INITIATIVE POSES FOR US, MARTIN CITED CORRIDOR GOSSIP TO THE EFFECT THAT THE PROPOSAL IS DIRECTED TOWARDS BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THE B-1 AND TRIDENT. HE SAID HE ASSUMED ON THE BASIS OF ISSRAELYAN'S EXPLANATION THAT NONE OF THESE WOULD BE AFFECTED SINCE, WHILE THEY HAVE NOT BEEN DEPLOYED, THEY ARE ALREADY IN EXISTENCE. HOW-

EVER, THE DRAFT TREATY WOULD STILL POSE PROBLEMS IF THE US AND USSR DECIDED TO REPLACE PRESENT GENERATIONS OF MISSILES. CRITICS SUCH AS GARCIA ROBLES (MEXICO) COULD THEN CLAIM WE WERE DEVELOPING "NEW SYSTEMS OF WEAPONS".

9. ON THE PROCEDURAL QUESTION, MARTIN CONTINUED THAT THE US CANNOT VOTE FOR A RESOLUTION WHICH PREJUDGES THE ISSUE BY STATING THE NECESSITY OF A MDW TREATY. MALIK REPLIED THAT THE PROBLEM IS ONE OF "WILL", TO DO SOMETHING OR NOT. HE CITED THE ENMOD PROPOSAL AS ONE WHERE LAST YEAR'S DIFFERENCES ON AN ANALOGOUS QUESTION HAD GIVEN WAY TO AGREEMENT AND JOINT SUBMISSION OF A TREATY TEXT.

10. TO ISSRAELYAN'S COMMENT THAT THE DRAFT RES DOES NOT ENDORSE BUT RATHER TAKES NOTE OF THE SOVIET DRAFT TREATY, MARTIN REPLIED THAT IT IS NOT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2 WHICH WE OBJECT TO BUT RATHER OPERATIVE PARA 1 WHICH INSTRUCTS THE CCD TO NEGOTIATE A TREATY. HE SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS THE RESOLUTION COULD CALL ON THE CCD TO EXPLORE WAYS TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM. ISSRAELYAN ASKED "WHAT FOR?" NO GOVERNMENT, HE SAID, WOULD ACCEPT DISCUSSION FOR DISCUSSION'S SAKE; THAT IS A MATTER FOR ACADEMICS AND PRIVATE GROUPS. MARTIN REPEATED THAT THE RESOLUTION PREJUDGES NEGOTIATIONS FOR A TREATY AND THAT THE US CANNOT COMMIT ITSELF TO CONFIDENTIAL

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NEGOTIATE UNLESS IT KNOWS WHAT IT WILL BE NEGOTIATING ABOUT.

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ACTION IO-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDA-05 ERDA-05 AF-06 ARA-06

CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-07 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NASA-01

NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01 PRS-01

OES-03 SS-15 USIA-06 SAJ-01 NRC-05 /120 W

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FM USMISSION USUN NY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USUN 6004

FOR ACDA AND IO

11. RESPONDING TO ISRAELYAN'S RENEWED EXPRESSION OF HOPE THAT THE US WOULD NEVERTHELESS SUPPORT THE MDW RES, MARTIN ASKED WHETHER PRESENT TEXT WAS "WRITTEN IN CONCRETE". ISSRAELYAN SAID YES; IT IS A QUESTION OF PRINCIPLE AND NOT A "SECONDARY INITIATIVE". MARTIN REGRETTED THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY LEEWAY ON THE SOVIETS' PART THERE WAS NOTHING TO BE WORKED OUT. WHILE HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS YET, HE SAID, HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE US WOULD HAVE TO ABSTAIN ON THE RESOLUTION IN ITS PRESENT FORM. HE ADDED THAT THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT WE WOULD NOT COOPERATE AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME. MARTIN ALSO POINTED OUT THAT A NUMBER OF WESTERN ALLIES ALSO HAD EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE PROPOSAL. HE CONCLUDED BY SUGGESTING THAT IF THE PRESENT DRAFT RES WAS NON-NEGOTIABLE, THE DISCUSSION SHOULD MOVE ON TO OTHER UNGA DISARMAMENT MATTERS.

12. FOLLOWING A LENGTHY INTERLUDE DURING WHICH OTHER TOPICS WERE DISCUSSED (REPORTED SEPTTEL, ISSRAELYAN RETURNED TO THE MDW PROPOSAL, NOW STATING THAT THE RESOLUTION CONFIDENTIAL

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IS NOT" IN CONCRETE." HE SAID THAT WHILE IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO REFER TO GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT ON THE NECESSITY OF CONCLUDING A TREATY ON NEW MDW WEAPONS, THE SOVIET UNION IS OPEN-MINDED AND WILLING TO DISCUSS THE WORDING OF THE RES. MARTIN REPLIED THAT IN THIS CASE WE WOULD BE GLAD TO DISCUSS THE DRAFT RES WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATION, AD REFERENDUM, TO SEE WHETHER A TEXT ACCEPTABLE TO THE US COULD BE DEVELOPED. HE STRESSED THAT THE RES WOULD HAVE TO BE GENUINELY PROCEDURAL. IT WAS AGREED THAT US AND USSR DELOFFS WOULD CONSULT EARLY IN THE WEEK OF NOVEMBER 17 TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES.

13. ON AT LEAST THREE OCCASIONS ISSRAELYAN ASSERTED

HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THE US HAD LOST INTEREST IN DIS-
ARMAMENT. WHEN HE REPEATED THIS POINT NEAR THE END
OF THE CONVERSATION, AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN ASSURED HIM
THAT WAS NOT THE CASE. AS EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY HE
CITED THE SECRETARY'S PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THE LUNCH
AND IN THE USSR'S VIEWS ON THE MDW INITIATIVE, NOTING
ALSO OUR WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE THE MATTER FURTHER.

14. REQUEST GUIDANCE ASAP FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION OF MDW
PROPOSAL WITH SOVDEL.
MOYNIHAN

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SURPLUS WEAPONS DISPOSAL, DISARMAMENT, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS
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Disposition Approved on Date:
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TAGS: PARM, PFOR, UR, US, UNGA
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006